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Denmark is one of the most developed welfare states, but also a rather capitalistic state with 
little public ownership outside the traditional fields of the public sector and the natural 
monopolies of the network industries. The low level of public ownership corresponds to 
peoples’ attitude in polls. Nevertheless, 12 privatizations of state companies have been made 
along with everybody else. No statistics on privatization have been previously published in 
Denmark. Most of the 12 privatizations are small, and the telephone company provides 76 
percent of the total revenue. In the municipal sector, however, most privatization activity 
appears to be outsourcing.  
Keywords: Privatization, outsourcing, capitalist values. 
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The data of the Appendix are collected in the Ministry of Finance by Martin Junker Nielsen 
(of the ministry) and Christian Friis Binzer (AKF), by going through 20 years of records. We 
have discussed the cases with Anders K. Balling of the ministry and several colleagues. Søren 
Risbjerg Thomsen helped with the World Value Survey data. We are grateful to Jürgen Jeger 
and other discussants at the CESifo conferences in München and Cadenabbia, as well as Jens 
Blom-Hansen. The Danish Crown is fixed to the Euro. For easy comparisons all prices are 
given in Euro.  Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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1.   Introduction: Two privatization frontiers  
Denmark is an advanced welfare state and widely perceived as semi-socialist. However, no 
private company has been (deliberately) nationalized the last 125 years, and few Danish 
business outside the network industries was built as an SOE (public corporation). Table 1 
gives a survey of the status in 2003, and a brief look backward and forward. Privatization is 








Note:   Numbers from the Fraser Institute data set. See Paldam (2003) and Gørgens, Paldam & Würtz (2003) 
discussing and using the index. The data contains fewer observations in the beginning than the end, and 
has been extrapolated backward for consistency in 6 groups. 
 
The leading index of economic freedom has Denmark as a typical Western country, slightly Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
 
3
above France that is rarely seen as particularly socialist, see Figure 1. The detailed data show 
that the public sector is relatively large, and that the “freedom” score is above average in 
other fields. That applies precisely to the sections of the index dealing with ownership, 
freedom of trade and finance. The Danish solution is thus on the one hand a large welfare 
state and on the other hand relative strict capitalism. For long it differed from the German 
model of “Soziale Marktwirtschaft” which was supposed to have more regulation and less 
welfare state, but the two models have converged. 
  Figure 1 shows that Denmark has moved toward a more liberal economy much as 
everybody else. Part of this process is the increased freedom of international capital move-
ments and other deregulation that will not be discussed, but some minor part is privatization 
and outsourcing. We use the usual definitions: Privatization is when the ownership of 
production units changes from public to private.
2 Outsourcing is when goods and services 
provided to people by the public are bought in the market, normally after competitive bidding. 
This is mainly done by the local authorities.  
  Section 2 is the historical background. The politics of privatization is covered in 
Section 3, while the actual cases are covered by Section 4. The gradual process of outsourcing 
production of public goods in the municipal sector is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 
6 contains a few concluding remarks.  Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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Table 1. Survey of production ownership and delivery 
Sector Status  Change  1980-2002  Plans  Experiences 
Primary sector  Private, except 2/3 of forests  Marginal  None  None 
Trade and finance  Over 99% private  Small privatizations  None  See 2.1 and 4 
Manufacturing  Over 99% private  Small privatizations  None  See 2.1 and 4 
Service production
a)
  Over 99% private  Small privatizations  None  See 2.1 and 4 
     Housing  Private, cooperative sub sector  None  Cooperative
b) Not  discussed 
Network industries  Public share about 70%  10% privatization  More expected  Discussed 
1. Electricity, hea- 
    ting often incl. 
Mixed state/municipal/private  
- no dominating owner 
Some shares sold  More to be sold  Not discussed 
2. Water  Municipal and private   Marginal  None  No study 
3. Natural gas net
c)  SOEs, State + other public  None   May be sold  See 2.3 
4. Telephone  Private  Privatized   None  See 4.1 




Main line may 
be sold 
See 4.2 
6. Buslines  About 80% private  20% privatization  More to be sold  See 4.2 and 5.3 
7. Post  Public  Postal bank sold  Plan to sell rest  See 4.2 
8. TV and radio  Main stations public, most 
other stations private  





9. Airline  SAS is SOE, 30% by other 
companies all private 
SAS Structure is 
made privatizable 
Shares may be 
sold 
See 2.3 
10. Airports  Two largest private, most 
smaller local public 
Most shares of Co-
penhagen Airp. sold 
Last shares may 
be sold  
See 4.2 
11. Roads  All public, no tolls      Not discussed 
12. Giant bridges  SOE’s, financed by tolls  Both opened  Next private  See 2.3 
1. Core public 
sector
e) 









 20-30 % cost 
savings see 5 
2. Auxiliary 
services 
60% outsourced        
a.  Service sector outside the traditional public sector. 
b.    Plans are being made to make social flats semi-private. The proceeds will to be used to build more flats. 
c.   Gas production is private, but gas pipelines are public. 
d.    Control of media is very political, and the “Left” has preferred public, while the “Right” has pushed for private 
ownersip. The result has been a whole set of complex compromises. 
e.   Core services are the ap 80% of public services which people demand in itself: Education, healthcare, etc., while 
non-core services are the auxiliary inputs in the production that people normally diregard.  
f.   Primary healthcare is done by “semi-private” practitioners, some special clinics are private too, 10% of primary 
and secondary education is nonprofit “private” schools, and also many kindergartens and old people’s homes are 
run by nonprofit “private” organizations. Little is run as business. 
g.  The Fogh Rasmussen government wants the citizens to have a free choice between private and public producers.  
 Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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2.   Development of the economic system 
Thus Denmark deviates a little from the average Western countries by combining (a) a 
relatively large welfare state with (b) a relatively capitalist system, both in the sense of 
relatively strict private property rights and (for a long time) unusually free trade.
3 We first 
discuss how the system originated (based on Paldam, 1991), and then turn to recent trends. 
 
2.1   Origin of the system: Extreme liberalism till the 1920s 
A large welfare state reduces incentives and needs relatively strict capitalism for efficiency. 
Also, in small countries “everybody” in the elite knows each other so a sharp division of 
powers and free trade is important. These arguments seem not to have played a political role. 
However, three “historic trends” are important: 
  (a) Denmark was unusually liberal in all respects during the Liberal Century (1818-
1914), especially in the period from 1870 to 1901, where a prolonged constitutional fight 
paralyzed political decision making.
4 The financial sector developed during the period of 
political paralysis and was fully private, but cooperative institutions as saving banks and 
(bond issuing) mortgage funds were important. The mortgage bonds were sold on the market, 
so real estate was (still is) in private hands – also financially. The cooperative sector has 
gradually grown to appear much as normal business. The public sector share was constant at 
about 9% of GDP like in the world’s most liberal country Hong Kong today, it was below the 
OECD average as late as 1960. The Danish Welfare state thus started from an unusually low 
point in the 1920s. 
  (b) Till 1950 Danish exports were largely agricultural, processed in the cooperative 
sector of the farmers. To get access to export markets for agricultural goods tariffs on other 
products were low. Also, the old trading/shipping business strongly favored free trade. 
  (c) Industry developed in the same way during the liberal century without public 
support and protection and with no natural base. It was(still is) mostly light industry. For long 
it for the home market, but it gradually turned to the world market. It is marked by a low level 
of concentration in the sense that no dominating firms exist. The biggest firm has since the Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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1930s been the shipping-trading conglomerate – Maersk – that has most of its activity abroad. 
It is a family company with one key owner, who has just turned 90.
5 
  Socialists wanting to take control of the commanding heights of capitalism have had a 
hard time finding these heights. Consequently, few proposals to nationalize have made the 
political agenda, and the few ones that happened were at the borderline to normal business.
6 
 
2.2   The welfare state and the big compromise after 1920 
The Social Democratic Party was the largest between 1924 and 2001, but it did not obtain a 
majority even with the parties of the (divided) Left Wing. This caused the small center parties 
– notably the Radical Party – to be pivotal in Danish politics. The center parties were against 
socialism, but for social responsibility, ie the welfare state. This led to a Big Compromise: 
The Left obtained the welfare state and the Right obtained rather strict capitalism. Polls have 
over the years demonstrated how the consensus has increased around this solution. Section 3 
discusses the most relevant set of such polls. In addition the precarious political balance in the 
country since the 1930s led to a tradition for cross-center agreements on the big issues. 
  The only significant case of a “rust-belt industry” – ie old heavy industries in distress 
– is the one of shipyards, of which Denmark used to have a dozen. Here a subsidy system of 
finance existed, much as everywhere else, but the state never took over, and when they failed 
they had to close, so only one major shipyard is left. In addition the State owned shares in a 
(small) metal recycling factory that recently went bankrupt. 
2.3   Special cases: Companies with a special licence and 7 new semi-commercial SOEs 
Two major Danish private industries have operated with a highly profitable public licence. 
They were allowed to keep the monopoly profits without much pressure or political 
discussion:  
  The Danish Alcohol Monopoly was the only firm allowed to distill alcohol between 
1923 and 1973.
7 However, import was always free, though liquor taxes were levied in a way 
favoring Danish “snaps”. The monopoly was revoked in1973, and the tax has been made Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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more even handed. Also, the distillery has been sold (by DANISCO) to a Swedish company 
(in fact to the Swedish State Liquor Monopoly).  
  A group of farmers and the Danish Sugar Company (now part of the DANISCO 
conglomerate) has since 1932 had a highly profitable licence system, which is now part of the 
EU sugar arrangement. It forces the consumers to buy sugar to a price about twice the world 
market price. The sugar company and the farmers split ap. € 150 mill of income due to the 
price difference. The drugstore licencing system is worth mentioning too. It was for long a 
closed system with a set number of controlled pharmacies. They ran (still do) a lobby from a 
palace near the Royal one, but a process of liberalization has started. 
  The SAS airline is jointly owned by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. It operated under 
a route licencing system like other national airlines, generating high fares and amazingly large 
rents in the form of excess costs. European air traffic is being gradually liberalized by the EU, 
the SAS corporate structure has been streamlined, and hard budget constraints have been 
introduced. This has made SAS cut costs – during the last 3 years by no less than 50%. Sector 
analysts seem to believe that some fat remains to be cut. 
  Finally, 7 new large SOEs have been formed: Five are in Natural Gas. In the first 
years of the 1970s natural gas and oil were found in the Danish parts of the North Sea. The 
exploration and production are private. A large majority in the Parliament decided that the oil 
and gas should be used to make Denmark self sufficient in energy.
8 With this aim 6 (now 4) 
SOEs were established by law in 1972. The largest was DONG, building and owning the 
national gas grid costing about € 5 bill, while the local net and sale were given to 5 (now 3) 
regional companies.
9 The decision to launch these companies were based on a compromise in 
the Parliament, where it was decided that natural gas was a viable production for the country, 
so the large subsidy necessary was hidden as a tax rebate (for “environmental” reasons). Now 
the net has been written sufficiently down so that the companies are almost viable, and they 
may be sold. 
  A similar case is the SOEs running two new giant bridge/tunnel-complexes both 
spanning waters of about 22 kms: (b1) The Great Belt Bridge built between 1982 and 1994 Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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between the islands of Funen and Zealand. (b2) The Oresund Bridge built 1995 to 2000 
between Zealand and Southern Sweden. Both were deemed too big and too uncertain for 
business. The first bridge is commercially successful, but the second is not, so a special cross 
subsidization arrangement has been made. A third giant bridge is now in the negotiating 
stage: (b3) The Fehmern Belt bridge connecting Zealand to Germany. It appears that it may 
be built by a private company. 
 
2.4  The rise and stabilization of the public share 
Between 1958 and 1973 the public sector increased from about 23% of GDP to about 50% or 
with 27 percentage points over just 15 years. The expansion was equally divided between an 
increased production of (non-defense) public goods and increased redistribution. The 
expansion was very smooth, and even when it was fully financed by taxes it caused a period 
of rapid growth. It created the Welfare state, but it did end up in a relatively large crisis.
10 The 
expansion had to be stopped and since the early 1980s the share has been almost constant just 
above 50% of GDP. 
  Denmark is highly dependent upon foreign trade, with trade shares of about 40% of 
GDP.
11 All “responsible” decision makers know that national competitiveness is crucial.
12 
Hence, it is important that the share of the public sector is controlled and not permitted to rise 
too much above the level in the EU and other main trade partners. 
  The dynamics of public sector growth and the demand of the public for increased 
service has made it a constant problem to prevent the growth of the public sector share. The 
ability of the politicians to control the costs of the programs is influenced by the fact that the 
share of the population that depends upon the public sector is now about 60%.
13 The strong 
upward drift in public spending, and the pressures on the decision makers to prevent the drift, 
have caused a pressure to privatize at the two relevant margins. On the one hand the public 
sector has wanted funds in the short run to finance the public sector and on the other hand it 
has wanted to reduce costs. Privatization of the last few “ordinary” SOEs – in particularly the Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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telephone company – has generated public income, and outsourcing has provided some 
savings.  
  The stories in the other papers of the conference show that the Danish story of privati-
zation is much as in other EU countries. We have found few indications that pressure from the 
EU mattered for most of the decisions in any of the concrete cases, but it is likely that the 
“Zeitgeist” of liberalization has contributed. It is, as always, difficult to substantiate. 
 
3.   Politics and values: The ownership issue 
Most economists see competition as the key to efficiency, so the question to any privatization 
is how it affects competition. Property rights theories claim that ownership matter more for 
efficiency.
14 Marxist theory considers the ownership to the means of production the basic 
factor shaping society, and hence the central political issue. Consequently, the ownership 
issue is complex and can easily be politicized. This may still happen in Denmark, but till now 
it has not, for two reasons: The largest privatizations have been done by the Center-Left, and 
private ownership is in accordance with the values of a large majority of the population. 
 
3.1   Privatization and party politics 
When the list of privatizations in the two appendix tables is compared with Table 2, it appears 
that most were done under the Center-Left government of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. 
 
Table 2. Danish governments during the last quarter-century 
 
From To  Prime  minister  Composition 
1975 Feb  1982 Sep  Anker Jørgensen  Socialdemocratic (minority) 
1982 Sep  1993 Jan  Poul Schlüter  Conservative/Liberal coalition, with various small parties 
1993 Jan  2001 Nov  Poul Nyrup Rasmussen  Socialdemocratic/Radical coalition 
2001 Nov  -  Anders Fogh Rasmussen Liberal/Conservative  coalition 
 
 The reasons for the privatizations seem to have been largely fiscal. When Tele Denmark and 
Copenhagen Airports were already SOEs, why not sell the shares? As the sales were done by Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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a Center-Left government neither the parties to the right nor the trade unions could protest, so 
the sales were largely uncontroversial. Most of the media space devoted to the sale of the 
phone company discussed the high price obtained. The present Liberal/Conservative coalition 
has undertaken to sell more. The sales planned are mostly in the network industries, see Table 
1. It appears that few decisions have been taken till now. 
 
3.2   An index of attitudes toward public vs. private ownership 
The World Value dataset covers the ownership issue by the item: Do you support 
Private/public ownership of business? Ronald Inglehart who headed the group developing the 
survey argues (see his 1997, p 316-18) that the question shows peoples attitudes on the 
ideological socialism/capitalism axis. The answers are on a 10-point scale, from (1) strong 
support for private over (5) neutral, to (10) strong support for public. Category (11) is don’t 
know. Figure 2 is a visual survey of the cumulative distributions of the 10 answers for 
selected countries. Only between 5% and 10% answer don’t know, so it is salient for people.
15 
 
Figure 2. Graphs for support for private vs public ownership for 6 countries in 1990 
We have drawn the answers for some countries as a cumulative curve. A high curve (toward Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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the NW) points to a high support for private ownership, while a low curve (toward the SE) 
points to a high support for public ownership. The straight neutrality-line from (0, 0) and (10, 
100) divide capitalist (above) values from socialist ones (below). Twice the area above the 
line in % of the area of the full square is a (Gini-type) score for the amount of capitalist 
values. If the area is below the line, it points to socialist values. Nearly all the curves 
discussed are above the axis and we have hence scaled the cumulative area above the axis as 
positive (for capitalist values). The area below the axis is thus negative (for socialist value).
16 
 
Table 3. “Capitalist” value scores for 22 developed countries in increasing order 
Country  Wave Score   Country  Wave Score   Country  Wave Score 
Spain    90  9.8  W  Germany  90  41.5   Australia    95  38.9 
Japan   90  10.0    Finland   90  42.3    Switzerland   96  48.2 
Britain  90 17.0    Austria    90 47.1    USA  95 52.6 
S Korea   90  17.6    Canada  90  48.1    Last wave – Eurobarometer 
N  Ireland  90 20.2    USA    90 52.1    Britain  99 18.0 
Netherlands  90 27.0    Different  waves    Portugal  99 20.3 
Italy    90  27.6   Spain    96  5.9  N  Ireland  99  24.4 
France   90  27.7    Taiwan   95  11.0    Germany *  99  26.0 
Norway  90 28.1    Britain  98 14.6    Netherlands  99 26.9 
Portugal  90 29.4    S  Korea    96 17.7    Ireland  99 30.3 
Sweden    90 29.4    Japan    95 17.8    Finland  99 30.4 
Ireland    90 33.1    Norway    96 24.9    Italy  99 32.2 
Belgium    90 34.0    Sweden    96 25.6    France  99 34.2 
Iceland    90 37.5    Finland    96 31.4    Iceland  99 41.9 
Denmark    90 41.1    W  Germany  97 34.0    Austria  99 47.5 
  Note:   The two main waves are from 1990 and 1999 for Europe only. 17 countries have more than 1 
observation. The average change is -0.6, so we are dealing with rather stable attitudes.  
 
The scores for all available developed countries are given in Table 3. The two waves of the 
World Value survey are from 1990 and 1999, but for 9 of the countries intermediate waves 
are available too. Only the first wave include Denmark, but Table 3 shows that these values 
change slowly in most of the countries. 
  Capitalist values dominate in all 22 countries though only marginally in Spain, but 
strong socialist segments of the population appear both in the Orient and in Latin Europe. 
With such a divided population the curve has a S-formed shape, so it is important to consider 
the whole curve. 
  Denmark is one of the countries with the highest capitalist values. Only the USA, 




17 are close to Denmark. The remaining 14 countries all have more socialist 
values. 
 
4.   The state sector: 12 privatizations and 15 dubious ones 
The Danish State sold a business 27 times from 1980 to 2002 as listed in the Appendix. Table 
A1 covers 15 dubious cases, while Table A2 holds 12 genuine privatizations. In addition a 
couple of SOEs went bankrupt and were liquidated, without a sale of assets.
18 When all the 27 
SOEs privatized are sorted by revenue a very skew distribution appears. One privatization 
accounts for 76% of the revenue, and 16 cases added provide less than 1%. The total revenue 
corresponds to 3% of GDP for the middle year, 1990, but it is only 0.15% per year for the two 
decades considered. Below we look at the cases in order of size. We start with the large one. 
4.1   Tele Danmark  
In November 1990 the four regional Danish phone companies were merged to TDC. Then 
they lost their monopoly, and finally they were sold to the US company Ameritech (now 
SBC) for 31.140 bill DKK or € 4.2 bill in 1998. Now a number of new operators are compe-
ting in the market, though TDC is still – by far – the largest operator. Also, much competition 
has emerged from the mobile phone market. The Danish phone companies were typical SOEs, 
while TDC is a private US company. Everybody expected the new company to be both leaner 
and meaner than the old SOE. However, TDC decided to start operations as a “nice” Danish 
company, and even put two former Ministers of Finance in charge: The chairman of the board 
is a former Social Democratic MoF (just retired) and the CEO is a former Conservative 
MoF.
19 
  The increase in competition on the market has caused prices to go down, so the 
company has been under a profit squeeze, and it has reduced personnel by 15% – first by not 
replacing  people going on pension and the by a round of sacking. Analysts of the branch 
already assume that the State obtained a rather good price.  
  The CPI price index for telephoning has fallen by 20% relative to the general index 
between 1998 and 2003, mostly due to a large drop in long-distance fares. However, the Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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composition of tele-services consumed have changes in the period and experts disagree about 
the average savings – the gain for the average family is probably larger. The story is thus 
fairly typical of the many privatizations of phone companies which have taken place 
throughout the world during the last two decades. 
  Politically, the privatization took place under a Social Democratic government and 
with little opposition in the Parliament. Also, it seems that the personnel in the company 
recognized that they could do nothing to prevent the privatization, so the whole process 
appeared to take place in a calm atmosphere. 
 
4.2   Four middle sized cases 
The three next privatizations sizewise are also all at the border to the traditional public sector: 
(1) The Public Pension Insurance Institute, (2) Copenhagen Airports and (3) the Postal Bank. 
  The first case is the pension system for civil servants. It worked as all other such 
systems and it was sold to a private company Baltica A/S in 1990. As the assets and liabilities 
are easy to assess the sale went smoothly, and hardly caused any debate. Also, no effects on 
the efficiency of the company have been reported. 
  Kastrup Airport (in Copenhagen) is the main international airport of the country and 
for the SAS airline. In 1990 Kastrup was merged with the much smaller Roskilde Airport, and 
turned into an SOE. Till now 66% of the shares have been sold to many investors at the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The main reason for the sale is fiscal, and little has changed in 
the way the airports run.
20  
  The third case is the one of the postal bank. The bank was made an SOE in 1993 and 
52% of the shares were sold, in 1995 the remaining shares were sold and the PostBank (in 
Danish GiroBank) merged with a savings bank Bikuben to BG Bank. Later BG Bank became 
a part of the largest Banking Company in the country, Danske Bank, but it continues running 
as BG Bank.  
  Finally two small cases relate to the potentially large case of the Danish Railways, 
DSB. One is the colorful case is Combus, a public bus corporation formed by DSB, to Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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compete with private bus companies. It did so by large scale underbidding at tenders for bus 
lines. When it later had to run the lines won, it did so with a large deficit. When the 
government enforced a hard budget constraint, the company went bankrupt after a much 
discussed scandal. Its remaining assets were sold for € 15. In 2002 a number of train sidelines 
in Jutland – which had till then been run by DSB – were outsourced. Even when DSB made a 
very low bid, the British company Arriva was chosen. In January 2003 Arriva started to run 
the train service. It took almost half a year before the service worked as well as it had before, 
but now customer’s satisfaction is as high as before (perhaps even higher). It has been 
reported that the effect of introducing conte stability in railways has greatly enhanced the 
efficiency of DSB. 
  DSB has been formally broken into smaller units – tracks, goods transport, 
ferryboats,... – and some or all of these parts may be privatized. While the division is being 
carried out it not yet decided whether the sales will be made. 
 
4.3   Remaining cases  
Datacentralen was a data processing company made to service the public sector. It was mode-
rately successful and was sold in two installments to the (much larger) US company CSC, 
which is still one of the largest data processing companies in the country. The Export Credit 
Insurance SOE, was sold to a major international concern in the field. Both sales seem to have 
followed normal business practices, and the prices reached appear to have been reasonable.  
  Most of the other remaining cases are empty/failed SOEs that were sold for next to 
nothing. Most are small, little known companies.  
  The Construction Machine Station was an SOE created to help small contractors in the 
building sector in 1948 as a Marshall Aid project. It started well, but it was not a dynamic 
enterprise, and when it was finally sold the feeling was that it had outlived its usefulness.  
  Five small consultancy services had branched off from larger public entities and 
obtained an independent life. They were sold to the market. One of these is the internet 
facility developed by the Uni-C, the university computer net. A sad case is the research-heavy Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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computer pioneer, Regnecentralen. At one stage it looked promising as a producer of 
technologically advanced small size mainframes, but it always lacked commercial acumen, 
and gradually lost its considerable human capital to university computer departments.  
  The final case is a popular amusement park has for a long time (allegedly since 1583) 
existed in the Royal Deer Park (established 100 years later). In 1997 the State decided to sell 
its interests in the holding company running the park at a nominal amount to the association 
of the owners of the stalls. 
 
4.4   Cases connected to Greenland 
Within the Danish Kingdom is the micro-state Greenland with 56'500 inhabitants. It has home 
rule, and an economic system, where the public owns virtually everything. Historically, it was 
a traditional LDC with hunting and gathering instead of agriculture till the early 1950s,
21 
when Danish politicians decided to change the colony to a “normal” Danish “county” by huge 
transfers of funds. The idea was to provide Danish institutions at the same standard as much 
as conditions permitted. The transfers have amounted to about € 15 bill till now. 
  Greenland obtained Home Rule in 1979, but the flow continues, and it now amounts to 
€ 8'700 per capita per year. The subsidy is not given to the individual Greenlander, but to the 
Home Rule Government. The transfer is a bit larger than Greenland’s production would be in 
the absence of the transfer. This has created a very strange economy, where virtually all 
“business” is in the form of heavily subsidized or protected SOEs, a price level 50% above 
the Danish one, and a huge public sector – collective consumption is no less than 55% of 
GDP, as explained in Paldam (1997). Five of the dubious cases are from Greenland.  
  The biggest of these cases is Kryolitselskabet Øresund that generated a privatization 
revenue of about € 100 mill. It was an SOE that ran a mine for the rare mineral cryolite 
(sodium aluminum fluoride) at Ivigtut in Greenland from 1870 to 1987, when the deposit was 
exhausted. Cryolite was the first catalyst in aluminum refining, and the company was thus a 
profitable operation, accumulating considerable assets (in Copenhagen). The surplus of the 
company corresponded to the deficit of the colony of Greenland, till big-style subsidization Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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started in the early 1950s. However, all cryolite ore was accounted for in the early 1980s and 
the company assets were sold to the insurance company Hafnia in 1985. 
  The remaining cases occurred in the late 1970s, when Greenland Home Rule was esta-
blished. In addition to the cases mentioned many “public firms” were donated to the new 
Home Rule Authority. The Royal Greenland Trading Company and the stock of public 
housing (virtually all housing in the towns) were thus donated to Greenland. Thus the State 
“lost” a great deal of Danish Property, but it was not privatized. 
  In order to gradually turn the economy more normal the State has converted its 
business activities into SOEs, and vague plans exist to gradually privatize these SOEs. Till 
now only one privatization has occurred, as the main chain of shops has been sold. However, 
most of Greenland’s SOEs operate with large subsidies or heavy protection, and with cost 
levels far exceeding the competitive ones, so they will be difficult to sell. Also, the boards of 
the SOEs are dominated by local politicians and examples are plentiful that political 
considerations override the ones of business. Even when most of the SOEs have Danish 
management they hence operate much as SOEs everywhere else.  
 
5.   Privatization in the municipal sector
22 
The Danish municipal sector is unusually large and powerful. It is forbidden to run, and to 
subsidize business in the traditional private sector. However, municipalities do run many 
small business like activities at the border between the sectors. Some privatizations have been 
made, but no central authority has kept track of what has happened. 
 
5.1  The municipal system and the formal nationalization of nonprofit organizations 
Local public utilities have traditionally been a main task for the municipalities. Supply of 
water, gas and electricity was organized as municipal activities in most urban municipalities 
already during the liberal century till the 1920’s. From their formation in the 1840’s 
municipalities were responsible for primary schools and social security, but private nonprofit 
schools have been an important part of the national cultural life – not least because of a Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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tradition for religious freedom. They hold about 10% of each age cohort. In social security 
private charity played an important role during the liberal century, but gradually the 
municipalities became involved. The modern local government system in Denmark was 
formed by two reforms:  
  (i) A system of economic equalization payments between rich and poor municipalities 
were established in the 1930’s. At the same time stronger central government norms for 
service provision passed parliament, when the Social Democratic party became the leading 
one. However, charity organizations were still allowed in the public service production.  
  (ii) The second round of institutional local government reforms took place in the years 
around 1970. Here 1300 municipalities were amalgamated into 275 new units and 14 counties 
were established with the same institutional and democratic status as the municipalities.  
  The reform of 1970 took place during the period of rapid growth of public 
expenditure, as married women entered the labor market earlier and stronger than in other 
European countries (except Sweden). The municipalities became the replacement of the 
family in childcare etc. The belief in the modern welfare state was strong, and it was to take 
full control over the production and distribution of welfare services. Consequently it became 
decisive for the efficiency performance in municipalities and counties to exploit economies of 
scale in the service production fully, and large units were needed. 
  After the structural reform a local nationalization process took place in Danish local 
government. The private school sector survived because of their cultural importance although 
the economic conditions were reduced, but almost all social institutions run by charity 
organizations or profit seeking organizations were enrolled into the public systems. 
 
5.2   Increasing outsourcing as a mean to control costs 
Research from many countries as surveyed by Borcherding, Pommerehne & Schneider (1982) 
and Domberger & Jensen (1997), show that the same goods and services are cheaper by 20-
30% in average if bought on a market than if they are produced by a public monopoly 
organization.
23 These results are confirmed by Danish studies such as Kristensen (1983), Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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Christoffersen, Paldam & Würtz (2000) and Blom-Hansen (2003). The knowledge of these 
facts spread much before they were analyzed and documented, and a new market orientation 
came up in the municipal sector since the early 1980’s. Three main reasons lie behind: 
  (1) The new market orientation may be a response to the increasing economic pressure 
on the welfare state in late 1970’s, were the public budget deficits exploded after fifteen years 
with immense public growth and after the economic recession with the oil crisis. A new 
Conservative-Liberal government in 1982 stopped further public growth definitively and 
started up a program for bringing in market forces to raise efficiency. A core point here was 
to urge local government to take up outsourcing in the service production. 
  (2) The fixed costs and economies of scale in the production of local and regional 
public services have become a more important factor in the cost function. The use of experts 
and automatic administration systems as a response to increasing requirements contributes to 
explain this change in cost structure. The small municipalities become squeezed by the 
increasing fixed costs and they can escape the higher unit costs by bringing in private 
producers. 
  (3) Liquidity pressures urge municipalities and counties to let private investors 
contribute to financing capital equipment, building stock and other capital assets. This 
perspective has in recent years been still more relevant as the central government regulation 
of local government economic activity now focuses on total spending including investment 
spending. 
 
5.3   Outsourcing: Nonpartisan local decisions and national politics  
No statistics are available for the amount of outsourcing done. However, casual observations 
and a couple of studies indicate that ap. 10% of municipal production is done by private 
companies.
24 The core areas as schools, hospitals etc., are still done by municipal or county 
employees, but marginal activities are often done by private companies. Typical examples are 
the cleaning of public buildings, regional bus lines especially at the countryside, repair of Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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public roads, trash collection, park maintenance, cafeterias in public institutions, fire engines 
and ambulances, etc. In such fields between 30% and 70% appears to be outsourced. 
  Christoffersen & Paldam (2003) analyzes the amount of outsourcing. It is largely an 
effect of modernity, i.e., it is largest in municipalities near main towns, with large shares of 
modern industry and less in traditional rural municipalities. Economic pressure on the munici-
pality increase outsourcing, while the share of population being dependent upon the public 
sector decreases outsourcing. Partisan politics was irrelevant. 
  While the proper privatizations discussed in Section 4 have caused little public 
controversy, outsourcing has sometimes been fiercely resisted by old stakeholders. The most 
notorious case is the one of the municipal bus company of the town of Esbjerg that lost the 
contract to a private company, Ribus. This caused a prolonged and – for Denmark – fairly 
violent blockade of the central garage of the new operator. However, the private company 
prevailed. 
  The former Social Democratic government did push for outsourcing, but at several of 
the annual meetings of the party controversy emerged on the issue, and the party maintains 
that outsourcing should not be allowed into the core areas, notably the hospital sector. The 
present Liberal-Conservative government has “free choice” between public and private 
suppliers of public goods as a much advertized policy. It has only ruled one year as this is 
being written, so it has still to be seen if the renewed push for outsourcing will cause a sizable 
change. At present there is only a couple of small private hospitals in the country, and no 
school is run for profit. 
 
6.   Conclusions: A typical story? 
The main message from the above story is that the international wave of privatizations in the 
1980s and 90s has been reflected in the Danish economy. That is, some network industries 
have been privatized and liberalized. This has met with little public resistance as it was 
mainly done by the center-left. Privatization has been a small political issue in Denmark as 
there has been little to privatize. This has historical reasons as discussed, and it was Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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demonstrated that the structure of ownership is well in accordance with the values and 
attitudes of the population. 
  The total privatization revenue amounts to app 3% of the GDP of the median year 
(1990) of the period considered, so per year it is 0.15%. As taxes amount to 50-52% of GDP, 
this is ap. 0.3% of the public revenue, but 76% came from the privatization of the phone 
company.  
  Even when the sales revenue is small seen in the perspective applied it was big a 
couple of years, and this may be the main motive. Another motive may have been to unload 
the state from awkward responsibilities. 
  With the slowly, but steadily increasing pressures to finance the welfare state new 
privatizations are being discussed and they will probably also be approved. The only ones 
possible are social housing and some of the network businesses: The postal service, the 
railroads, the public part of the utilities and the natural gas companies. All of these are already 
under discussion, but it appears that the government is slow making up its mind as they are 
“natural monopolies”, which may be is problematic to run as private companies. However, 
one may argue that they are not running impressively well now. 
 Appendix: Privatizations by the Danish State, 1980-2002. The list is made by a 
check of all “acts” to the “Financial Committee of the Parliament”, which should consider all 
“deliberate” reductions in public assets. Hence, the list should be complete. It is divided in 
two parts: Dubious cases and the genuine privatizations. 
 
Table A1. State sale/discharge of shares and assets in firms 1990-2002 – 15 dubious cases 






 1  Eurochemie  Eurochemie  1983 -/0  Capital reduction  1.5 
 2  Nuuk fish industry, Greenland  Godthåb fiskeindustri  1985 41/0  Write off  0 
 3  Sawmill in public forest  Centralsavværket 1985 -/0  Symbolic  sale  0 
 4  Land surveyor IT service  Landinspektørernes EDB  1985 -/0  Write off  0.02 
 5  Mestersvig Mine, Greenland 
1)
 Nordisk  Mineselskab  1985 -/0 Capital  reduction  0.6 
 6  Windmill production  Dansk Vindteknik 1985 -/0  Capital  reduction  0.7 
 7  Production of biogas turbine  Scanenergi 1985 -/0  Capital  reduction  0.3 
 8  Cryolite Mine, Ex-Greenland 1)  Kryolitselskabet Øresund A/S  1985 50/0  Sale of share  97 
 9  Greenland travel bureau  Grønlands Rejsebureau  1986 33/0  Sale to Home rule  0.1 
10 Environmental  products  2)  Naturdan A/S  1991 /0  Write off  0 
11  Computer production co 3)  A/S Regnecentralen af 1979  1992 /0  Direct sale  0.07 
12  Transport of hazard. waste 2)  Danfragt A/S  1996 33/0  Direct sale  0 
13  University internet service  UNI-C's internetaktiviteter  1997 -  Sale of assets 5)  1 
14  Amusement park holding co  A/S Dyrehavsbakken 1997 50/0  Insider  sale  0.03 
15  Bankrupt public bus co 4)  Combus A/S  2001 100/0 Direct sale  0 
         Sum:  101 
Source: Budget acts. Column 4 shows state share of equity before and after.  
     1.   Assets (including financial) left in Copenhagen after exhaustion of mine. The Ivigtut mine was run by a 
company in Copenhagen having expensive real estate and accumulated funds as well.  
     2.   These companies were almost empty at the time of the closing. 
     3.   Regnecentralen was established to produce mainframes, and it developed away from world standards. 
     4.   Combus was established as a competitive company participating in the outsourcing of bus lines. It did 
win many contracts, but at prices below production costs, and went bankrupt. 
     5.   The exact sales revenue is secret.  
 
 Table A1 contain 15 dubious cases, which appears under the heading privatizations in the 
“acts”. Most are of two types: (1) Cases where an SOE has failed and is closed, but contains 
assets of some value: This applies to: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 15. In nearly all of these 
cases the activity of the company has de facto ceased and in only one of the cases (8) valuable 
assets remained. In cases 1, 2 and 9 the company is sold to or given away to a foreign public 




commercially valuable, but small activity in a research institute was sold, and case 14 where a 
very old legally complex ownership problem was solved. 
 
Table A2. State sale of shares and assets in firms 1991-2002 






 1  Junker Industries  do  1989 37/0  Direct sale  7 




opoly 1 of 3  anmark A/S 
Reorga ion 
n Airports 1 of 3  nhavns Lufthavne A/S   1 O  
t 
tforsikring A/S  
S  
sing co 1 of 2  entralen A/S  100/25
d testing co  KO 
. Reisebüro GmbH 
ltancy service 
5654 
Byggeeksport 1989 51/0  Direct sale 
 3  Construction machine station  Byggeriets Maskinstation 1990 68/0  Block sale  6 
 4  Civil Servants Life Insur.  Statsanstalt. for Livsforsikring  1990 100/0  Direct sale 
 5  Postal Bank 1 of 2  GiroBank A/S  1993 100/49 pen bidding 98 
  b  - - - 2 of 2  - - -   1996 49/0 Direct  sale  100 
 6  Phone Mon Tele D 1993 94/90  ?  11 
  b  - - - 2 of 2  - - -  1994 90/*  nizat 121 
  c  - - - 3 of 3  - - -  1998 */0  Direct sale  4237 
 7  Copenhage Købe 1994 00/75 pen bidding 95 
  b  - - - 2 of 3   - - -  1996 75/51  Open bidding  148 
  c  - - - 3 of 3 p - - -   2000 51/34  Open bidding  132 
 8  Export Credit Insur. 1 of 2  EKR Kredi 1995 100/75 Direct sale  10 
  b  - - - 2 of 2  - - -   1997 -  ale of assets 37 
 9  Data proces Datac 1996 Direct sale  46 
  b  - - - 2 of 2  - - -  1999 25/0 Direct  sale  17 
10  Standard an DEM 1996 100/0  Direct sale  4 
11  Travel bureau  Skandinav 1998 100/0  Direct sale  0.9 
12  Railroad consu Banestyrelsen Rådgivning  2001 100/0  Direct sale  10 
         Sum: 
 
Table A2 contain the remaining 12 cases which are the genuine privatizations. They are once 
again in chronological order. When the sale is done in several “rounds” they are put together, 
so that only the first round is in chronological order. The strange looking change in public 
shares in item 6b is a posting made in connection with the company reorganization, before the 
sale. 





Blom-Hansen, J., 2003. Is private delivery of public services really cheaper? Evidence from public road 
maintenance in Denmark. Public Choice 115: 419-438. 
Borcherding, T.E., Pommerehne, W.W., Schneider, F., 1982. Comparing the efficiency of private and public 
production: The evidence from five countries. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 89 (suppl. 2): 127-56. 
Christoffersen, H., Paldam, M., Würtz, A., 2000. Public versus private production and economics of scale. 
Accepted by Public Choice. 
Christoffersen, H., Paldam, M., 2003. Markets and Municipalities. A Study of the Behavior of the Danish 
Municipalities. Public Choice 114: 79-102. 
Domberger, S., Jensen, P., 1997. Contracting out by the public sector; theory, evidence, prospects. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 13: 67-80. 
Gørgens, T., Paldam, M., Würtz, 2003. How does public regulation affect growth? Working paper, Department 
of Economics, University of Economics. 
Inglehart, R., 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 
Societies. Princeton U.P.: Princeton, N.J. 
Inglehart, R., Basañez, M., Moreno, A., 1997. Human Values and Beliefs. Michigan UP: Ann Arbor. 
Kristensen, O.P., 1983. Public versus private provision of governmental services: The case of Danish fire 
protection services. Urban Studies 20: 1-9. 
Paldam, M., 1991. The Development of the Rich Welfare State of Denmark. In Blomström, M., Meller, P., eds., 
Diverging Paths. Comparing a Century of Scandinavian and Latin American Economic Development. 
Johns Hopkins UP: Baltimore. 
Paldam, M., 1997. Rent seeking and Dutch Disease. An Essay on Greenland. European Journal of Political 
Economy 13: 591-614. 
Paldam, M., 2003. The Economic Freedom of Asian Tigers. An essay on controversy. European Journal of 
Political Economy 19: 453-478. 
Pejovich, S., 1997. The Economic Foundations of Property Rights: Selected Readings. Edward Elgar Pub.: 
London. 
Pipes, R., 1999. Property & Freedom. Harvill Press: London. 
 Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
 
24







1If possible we refer to published material. Especially when it comes to the results of the privatizations few 
studies exist. Much of the information reported is consequently based on newspaper articles and private 
information from people, who should know. In these cases we use terms such as “it is reported that” or “it 
appears that”. 
2In Denmark mainly by the state, and in the form of the sale of shares in SOEs. Sometimes the change from 
being an “administrative branch” to becoming an SOE, may be a step on the way to a privatization, but also it 
may not. We use the strict definition of a change of ownership.  
3If the average rate for effective protection could be calculated for all countries for the 19th and 20th centuries 
Denmark would probably take the gold medal – or at least the one of silver – for free trade. 
4From 1866 to 1901 the King kept a government of the Right (the old “feudal” group) in power, while the 
majority in the Parliaments became increasingly dominated by the farmers. They rejected all proposals from the 
Government, while it managed to prevent the King from signing the law approved by the Parliament. Most 
public sector decision making thus stopped for almost half a century. 
5The company was formed by a captain owning a couple of ships and his son, who was an extraordinarily able 
businessman, and so was his son the present owner, who has just resigned. The next generation will not manage 
the company, and the corporate structure has been changed accordingly. 
6From 1840 a dozen private railways were launched. Most of the new railways failed and were therefore taken 
over by public sector and in 1885 the public railways were merged into one company (DSB, still existing). A 
similar story can be told about a number of harbors. The only “borderline” nationalization in the 20th century 
has been the pilot service in the Danish sealanes.  
7Retail sale of products containing alcohol has always been free in Denmark, contrary to the situation in the 
other Nordic countries. The alcohol tax has been halfway between the Swedish and the German one. Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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8It would have been commercially better to sell the gas to foreign companies that already had pipelines nearby. 
However, at that time the two future energy sources appeared to be either atomic energy or arab oil. To obtain 
“energy security” it was decided to reserve the Danish North Sea oil and gas for national uses.  
9The regional companies are partly owned by the municipalities, and they have obtained a rather bad reputation 
as places generating incomes and perks to local political elites.  
10Both the expansion of the golden 1960s and the crisis after 1973 were strong in Denmark relative to the similar 
trends throughout Western Europe.  
11Exports and imports of goods and services in percent of GDP. 
12Competitiveness has two margins: Externally it means that domestic goods can compete with foreign in the 
market, internally it means that the tradables sector can compete with the nontradables sector for resources. 
13Christoffersen & Paldam (2003) terms this the welfare coalition. It is the share of those, who work in the 
public sector plus those, who receive an income compensating social payment in some part of the year.  
14A collection of the main articles are found in Pejovich (1997), see also the long essay Pipes (1999). 
15See Inglehart, Basañez & Moreno (1997). The data used are from home page of project. We disregard the 
don’t know and start the cumulative curves (0,0). The curve thus ends at (10, 100) per definition. Points for 
answers, 1, 2, ... , 9 are non-trivial. The area between the curve and the straight neutrality-line from (0,0) to (10, 
100) measures excess “capitalist” values if the area is above the line or excess “socialist” values if the area is 
below the line. 
16From the chapters of the volume it is obvious that other motives than ideological ones exists to nationalize or 
create public firms, see e.g. the chapters on Finland and Spain. 
17The survey is done separately from the (former) DDR. It was even more capitalist than West Germany in 1990, 
where the Easterners wanted to be westernized, but it was much less capitalist in the latest wave, as many have 
developed second thoughts, and a wave of “ostalgia” has swept the area of the late DDR. Christoffersen & Paldam: Privatization in Denmark 
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18This applies to the Military Uniform Factory and the Naval Shipyard – they were changed from being Military 
institutions into becoming SOEs in the early 1980s, but never privatized. The Military Uniform Factory went 
bankrupt in 1996 in a rather spectacular way and was liquidated, and the Naval Shipyard was closed too, though 
in a less spectacular way. 
19His description of events is that the process changing the company was planned during his own tenure as MoF 
in the Schlüter government, as a reaction to the EU “Green Book” on telecommunication. Hence it would make 
the process truly non-political. 
20The second airport in the country is Billund Airport. It has remained private as it started as the company airport 
of LEGO, and gradually developed into the main airport in Jutland. The public Aarhus Airport is losing 
passengers, due to a bad location, which local politics has made it impossible to change. 
21As much as such comparisons make sense Greenlanders (an Inuit/Eskimo people) had an African standard of 
living, and a widely dispersed population.  
22Background: Three levels exist in Denmark: (1) State 45%, (2) County 8%, (3) Municipality 45%, where the 
percentage given show the share of total expenditures they administrate in 2001. Local governments have the 
right to impose income taxes as well as land taxes, within certain limits. 
23The distribution of cost differences has a large variance and it is upward skew. In about 10% of the cases the 
public producer is cheaper, but at the end of the tail large cost differences appear. Public producers sometimes 
diverge into remarkable inefficiency before the system reacts. In Denmark the most famous case of such 
divergence is the postal letter sorting facility (Postterminalen) between 1970 and 1985. 
24Another 10% is done by non-profit NGOs under municipal control. Thus 10% of the schools are non-profit 
NGO’s, of which some are, e.g. Catholic or Islamic.  
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